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ZONING LAWS AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
The common law has provided us with much of our law of
property. However, it seldom contemplated governmentally en-
forced limitation on the private use of one's realty. Zoning as such
a limitation is a statutory development of the twentieth century.'
The courts have allowed zoning limitations to be enforced by public
agencies and private individuals alike but have refused to allow
evidence of zoning violations to be used in actions for personal
injuries.
The purpose of this comment is to present the idea that zoning
laws should be construed as safety ordinances and that, as such,
violations of them should be admissible as evidence of negligence
in civil actions. A brief history of zoning and a discussion of the
purposes of zoning presently recognized by the courts will be
followed by a consideration of recognized safety statutes and the
evidentiary significance given them by the courts as related to
modern zoning laws.
ZONING FOUNDATIONS AND HISTORY
The first crude attempts at zoning were made around the turn
of the century. In Chicago and St. Louis some planners, assisted by
the city councils, tried to limit the types of residences built in exclu-
sive residential neighborhoods.2 These ordinances were discarded
since the courts, finding that similarly situated land had no restric-
tions, reasoned that the ordinances discriminated against residents
of the zoned neighborhood and were unconstitutional.3 Such adverse
decisions convinced many would-be zoning innovators that all
zoning attempts would be unconstitutional.
Pioneer zoners did, however, manage to pass state zoning en-
abling acts empowering municipalities to create comprehensive
plans for community zoning. The first such act was in New York4
1 See Toulouse v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 393, 87 A.2d
670, 673 (1952): "Before the adoption of modern zoning laws, the
owners of property were restricted in the use of their property only
by prohibitions of use recognized by the common law... as detrimental
to the rights of the public."
2 See E. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADmIsTmRTcON AND COURT DE-
CISIONS DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 9 (2d ed. 1940).
s See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
4 N.Y. LAWS ch. 466, (1901), as amended, N.Y. LAWS ch. 470, (1914);
N.Y. LAWS ch. 497, (1916).
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and was upheld by the courts of that state in 1920. 5 By that year
only about thirty-five zoning ordinances had been enacted in the
United States.6
The first comprehensive plans provided that: (1) the entire
municipality should be zoned, (2) the regulations should be reason-
able and not discriminatory and (3) the regulations should have a
substantial relation to the health, safety, comfort and convenience
of the community.
7
1926 produced the first significant zoning decision in a federal
court. Prior to that time many state courts were undecided as to
the validity of zoning attempts. In that year the United States
Supreme Court sustained zoning as constitutional in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." In that case, counsel for the village,
and counsel for the National Conference on City Planning as amicus
curiae, presented quantities of published sociological material on
the effects of congestion, the benefits of an abundance of light and
air, and the advantages of separating the locations of residences,
stores and factories.9 In accepting this evidence and upholding the
ordinance, the court said:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities... [W]hile the
meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet new and dif-
ferent conditions .... 10
6 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209(1920). Nebraska's first zoning enabling acts were passed by the
legislature in 1929. Enabling acts may be found at NEB. REv. STAT.
§14-401 (Reissue 1962) (for cities of metropolitan class); NEB. RV.
STAT. §15-902 (Reissue 1962) (for cities of primary class); NEB. REV.
STAT. §19-901 (Reissue 1962) (for cities of the first and second class
and villages); and NEB. REv. STAT. §23-161 (Reissue 1962) (for county
districts).
See C. RRYNE, MuNiciPAL LAW 811 (1957).
7 See E. BASSETT, ZoNNG: THE LAWS, ADmnmTRATioN Am COURT DE-
cIsioNs DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 9 (2d ed. 1940).
8 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9 See E. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWs, ADi'.mqISTRATIoN AND COURT DE-
cIsioNs DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 47 (2d ed. 1940) which dis-
cusses the brief submitted by James Metzenbaum, counsel for Euclid,
Ohio and the brief of Alfred Bettman for the National Conference on
City Planning as amicus curiae.
10 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
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Since that decision zoning has become an increasingly important
phase of municipal law and a great share of the urban population,
as well as some of the rural population, is subjected to zoning
controls.
ZONING-ITS PURPOSES
Zoning ordinances have many purposes, both specifically stated
by statute and expressed in decisions of the courts. Many of the
judicially articulated purposes are probably a result of a combina-
tion of time, place and need.
It has been said that zoning has a purpose of fostering proper
development of a district by classifying buildings and their use.1 . It
has also been said that zoning is designed to stablize property uses;
12
to encourage more appropriate use of the land;13 to conserve the
value of property, 4 to protect zones during the present, the transi-
tional period, and the future;' 5 and to devote areas to selected uses.16
Although the courts have often relied on all of these, as well as
other purposes, the most frequent argument for land use regulation
is the police power-"... the power of government to enact all
manner of laws in furtherance of the public safety, health, morals,
general welfare and prosperity of the body politic."'1 7 Many zoning
cases as well as most zoning laws use the words "health, safety and
general welfare" in stating the purposes of zoning. Very few courts,
however, have ever chosen to define what is meant by any of these
words, and specifically "'safety". Those that have undertaken to
define "safety" have chosen not to accept common meanings, such
as "freedom from exposure to danger",' but rather have simply
found that "a zoning ordinance is not a safety statute in the usual
sense of that term."'19
Zoning statutes and ordinances give no definition for any of the
terms used to designate the general purposes of their existence.
When no different or special meaning is indicated by a legislative
11 State v. Rowland, 131 Conn. 261, 38 A.2d 785 (1944).
12 Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 28, 54 A.2d 675
(1947).
13 Griggs v. City of Paterson, 132 N.J.L. 145, 39 A.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
14 Barkmann v. Town of Hempstead, 268 App. Div. 785, 49 N.Y.S.2d 262
(1944).
15 Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942).
16 Hutchinson v. Cotton, 236 Minn. 366, 53 N.W.2d 27 (1952).
17 Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 449,
21 N.E.2d 993, 997 (1938).
18 WEBsTEa's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1998
(1967).
19 Hutchinson v. Cotton, 236 Minn. 366, 368, 53 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1952).
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enactment the general rule of construction is that the words are to
be given their natural meaning unless to do so would lead to un-
reasonable results plainly at variance with the evident purposes of
the law.20 Therefore, the word "safety" in terms of its association
with the police power, should be given its everyday meaning.21
Even if the word "safety" is given its natural meaning when
used in zoning legislation, one might still argue that it was included
merely as part of a phrase establishing the enactment's general
relation to the police power. However, this argument is untenable,
since statutory interpretation should give effect to each of the
several parts of the statute, rejecting no sentence, clause or word
as meaningless if it can be avoided.22
VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY STATUTES AND ORDINANCES IN
COMPARISON
If "safety" means "freedom from exposure to danger, 23 it would
certainly seem that any statute or ordinance declaring that "safety"
is one of its purposes should be considered as being enacted to pro-
tect individual members of the public from danger.
Other ordinances and statutes, not concerned with zoning, have
often been held to be safety statutes. Furthermore, courts have
allowed individuals to recover damages for injuries sustained by
their violation. While Nebraska holds that such a violation is only
evidence of negligence,24 many other jurisdictions have found that
such as violation is negligence per se.25
Normally, only a fine or imprisonment is imposed for violating
a statute or ordinance. However, under certain conditions a statute
may outline a standard of conduct designed to protect others, the
legislative standard being substituted for the socially acceptable
standard of a reasonable man.26
20 Bachus v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 1, 136 N.W.2d 189 (1965), City of Lincoln
v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373 (1936), State v. School Dist. of Nebraska City,
99 Neb. 338, 156 N.W. 641 (1916).
21 Cf. Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939); Winterson v.
Pantel Realty Co., 135 Neb. 472, 282 N.W. 393 (1938); Hanley v.
Fireproof Bldg. Co., 107 Neb. 544, 186 N.W. 534 (1922); Hoopes v.
Creighton, 100 Neb. 510, 160 N.W. 742 (1916); Fowler Packing Co. v.
Enzenperger, 77 Kan. 406, 94 P. 995 (1908).
22 Hansen v. Dakota Co., 135 Neb. 582, 283 N.W. 217 (1939), Hagenbuck
v. Reed, 3 Neb. 17 (1873).
23 WEBsTER's TaiRD NEW INTERATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRMGED 1998
(1967).
24 See Crandall v. Ladd, 142 Neb. 736, 7 N.W.2d 642 (1943).
25 See generally Annot., 132 A.L.R. 863, 870 (1940).
26 W. PiossER, LAW Or TORTS 191 (3rd ed. 1964).
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Recovery under this theory requires one to show he was within
the class of persons for whose benefit and protection the ordinance
was enacted, that there was a violation of the ordinance by the
defendant and that he suffered damages as a proximate result of
the violation.2 7
The enactments which legislatures and courts have defined as
safety ordinances have for some time been a basis for recovery in
tort actions. Violations of such laws as those requiring fire escapes
on buildings,28 requiring hand railings on stairways, 29 or fire doors
on certain structures" have been used as evidence of negligence.
While these decisions indicated the courts' willingness to allow re-
covery for injuries sustained because of statutory violations, the
courts have never chosen to allow recovery for zoning ordinance
violations.
Hutchinson v. Cottonsl is one of the few cases to have dealt with
violations of zoning laws as negligence. In that case the defendant
lived in an area zoned for residential purposes only but was making
use of his garage to manufacture a product with a power planer.
A child sustained injuries when he fell into the planer and he sued
to recover for them. Although the zoning ordinance involved ex-
pressly indicated that "safety" was one purpose of its enactment, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered it proper not to instruct that
a violation was negligence per se. The court reasoned that since a
violation of the ordinance was dependent upon the motive or pur-
pose of the actor, here the defendant using a power planer, the
legislature could not have intended that mere technical non-compli-
ance should be a basis for recovery of damages.
Another case which discusses zoning law infractions as negli-
gence is Neuber v. Royal Realty Co.3 2 in which the plaintiff was
burned in an explosion and fire caused by her employer's negligent
failure to keep the workroom free from a highly combustible waste
material. The plaintiff sued the employer's landlord contending that
his failure to maintain the required number of exits per square feet
of floor space as directed by the local zoning ordinance was the
cause of her injuries. Here the court ruled that no error was com-
mitted by refusing to admit in evidence the violation of a zoning
27 Hersh v. Miller, 169 Neb. 517, 99 N.W.2d 878 (1959); Strahl v. Miller,
97 Neb. 820, 151 N.W. 952, Aff'd, 239 U.S. 426 (1915).
28 See Hoopes v. Creighton, 100 Neb. 510, 160 N.W. 742 (1916).
29 See Shramek v. Huff, 135 Neb. 178, 280 N.W. 450 (1938); Winterson v.
v. Pantel Realty Co., 135 Neb. 472, 282 N.W. 393 (1938).
80 See Frontier Steam Laundry Co. v. Connolly, 72 Neb. 767, 101 N.W.
995 (1904).
31 236 Minn. 366, 53 N.W.2d 27 (1952).
32 86 Cal. App. 2d 596, 195 P.2d 501 (1948).
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ordinance, saying that the purpose of such laws was "... to prevent
the property of one person from being damaged by the encroach-
ment of a neighboring property in a manner not compatible with
the general locality of the two properties."33 The court held that
the zoning ordinance was not designed to protect employees from
injury by fire, that such protection was afforded by fire ordinances,
that a fire ordinance had not been violated and that the plaintiff was
not in the class of persons the ordinance was designed to protect.
To further substantiate the lack of error the court then pointed out
that the fire was due to the employer's negligence and that the
zoning violation by the owners of the building was not the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries sustained.
These two cases further substantiate the fact that civil recovery
for violations of a statute or ordinance cannot exist where the before
mentioned requirements are not present. Those requirements again
were: (1) that the injured party be within the class of persons for
whose benefit and protection the ordinance was enacted, (2) that
there was a violation of that ordinance by the defendant and (3)
that an injury proximately resulted from that violation. Had all
three of these been met in Hutchinson v. Cotton, and Neuber v.
Royal Realty Co. the results may have been different.3 4
It is not difficult to imagine instances of zoning violations in
which these requirements may be met, but it is difficult if not
impossible to determine just how often such situations actually
arise since so few cases have reached reporting levels on this specific
question. Two examples of such situations follow.3 5
EXAMPLE I: John Q. Tyre lives in a relatively new residential
area zoned Class A residential.36 Only single family dwellings are
33 Id. at 604, 195 P.2d at 510.
34 If the violation in Hutchinson v. Cotton had been of such a nature as
could only be in derogation of the ordinance as in Example I, or if the
violation in Neuber v. Royal Realty Co. had been the proximate cause
of the injury as in Examples I and I.
35 The examples are of need somewhat extreme to better illustrate the
presence of the three requirements of recovery based upon violations
of ordinances and to disregard as much as possible any other negligence
upon which recovery could be based. More situations of any everyday
nature can probably be discovered.
36 An example Class A residence law as taken from the LmcoLx, NEB
MUNICIPAL CODE, Ch. 27.10 allows: (a) single family dwellings, (b)
parks and playgrounds and community bldgs owned or operated by
the public agency, (c) public libraries, (d) public schools or private
schools having a curriculum equivalent to a public school and having
no rooms regularly used for housing or sleeping purposes, (e) churches
(with limitations as to off-street parking), (f) golf courses, except
miniature courses and driving tees.
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allowed. He has found that the community in which he lives has
no facilities for recapping tires and believes he sees an opportunity.
He buys some used recapping equipment and attends a school to
learn how to recap tires. Unable to obtain a suitable location in
the industrial zones he temporarily sets up shop in his two car
garage, knowing at the time that by so doing he has violated the
community zoning laws.
Shortly after beginning operations, Johnny Neighbor, a young-
ster from next door enters the garage to watch and is severally
burned when he falls and comes into contact with the tire former.
John Q. Tyre should be held liable for Johnny's injury because
of the violation of the ordinance. The zoning law was enacted to
protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. Johnny
is a member of that public and without the violation of the ordinance
he would not have been injured.
EXAMPLE II: Jim Grub buys a small vacant tract of land in
an area zoned Class A residential, as in Example I. This tract ad-
joins a large section of the zone already developed. He is what
the public might call a hermit collector and enjoys collecting trash
and junk. Jim has a truck with which he hauls trash and garbage
from homes in other parts of the city to this tract. He dumps it,
intending later to sort through it for items which he can resell.
This "annex to the town dump" became a breeding ground for rats
and other vermin. One of the rats strayed to a neighbor's back
yard and bit Mr. Jones, causing a serious infection. Jones sued
Grub contending that Grub's violation of the zoning ordinance
was negligence; and he (Jones) was a member of the class which
the law was designed to protect and that the violation was the
direct cause of the injury sustained. It was submitted that Jones
should recover.
CONCLUSION
It is essential in creating, reading and interpreting zoning laws
that we never lose sight of the over-all importance of their com-
plete enforcement. "What we must be concerned with is nothing
less than the physical future of the civilized world-the environ-
ment in which men live on earth. '37
As society becomes more complex and the world more crowded,
the need for societal action to prevent injuries and deaths becomes
more apparent. Man has made tremendous strides toward safety
from natural dangers, but at the same time these have been replaced
37 G. BREESE, D. W=ITEmAN, AN APPROACH TO URBAN PLANNING 38 (1953).
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by man-made dangers which often prove to be even more dangerous.
Two factors increasing the danger of modern living are man's de-
pendence upon one another, and congested living conditions.3 8
When the world was less densely populated and everyone was more
dependent on himself to satisfy his wants, what one did had little
effect upon others. Today what one man does may affect many
others.
Society today, more than ever before, is showing an increasing
interest in the fight for safety. The public has become more con-
scious of accidents and injury.
A nation previously flippant about 100,000 annual accidental
deaths and 10,000,000 annual accidental injuries, suddenly considers
such an epidemic immoral and recognizes the need to prevent such
slaughter. In response to this need, the law has only begun to throw
off the legal straight jackets which have insulated negligent manu-
facturers from suit. A manufacturer's duty ... has become the con-
cern of the legal profession, which has never had occasion to
examine what constituted due care 3 9
Safety statutes are well established as bases for civil recovery.
Attachment of similar effect to zoning ordinances would do much
to increase the protection of the public from the man-made dangers;
those brought about by increases in population, decreases in avail-
able real estate and congested living conditions.
The minimal fines provided by most zoning ordinances are
insufficient to secure the desired results. It seems not unlikely that
the possibility of civil liability arising from violation of these
ordinances will increase compliance with the law and give the public
the protection from today's dangers which society demands in this
twentieth century.
There is little doubt that provision for civil liability can be
made by the legislatures, the county boards and the city councils,
but the courts should remember that enacting bodies do not always
take the lead. It should always be realized that men and their
society are moving ahead by tremendous strides leaving the laws in
the trail behind them.
Leroy W. Orton '69
38 This consideration was presented in the argument to the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, (1926), but the real effect of the facts were passed
over lightly in the decision which somewhat rested on direct constitu-
tional grounds.
39 Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation,
41 NoTRE DAm LAwyE 1, 2 (1965).
